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Abstract: Building the Large Hadron Collider (1995-2008) required frontier technologies. 
We wanted to discover whether there has been a long-term "learning by doing" effect on CERN 
suppliers' profitability, beyond the initial order. The evidence on this effect was until now 
fragmentary, mainly based on interviews or case histories. CERN granted us access to their LHC 
procurement database, including 1360 suppliers from 35 countries for a total of 11969 orders. 
We collected 23-year long time series of financial data (1991-2013) for a large sample of 
companies. After controlling for time fixed-effects and trends, firm-level and country-level 
possible confounding factors, we observe a statistically significant (p<0.01) 'CERN effect' on 
long-run profit margin of high-tech suppliers, while the effect on non-high-tech suppliers is not 
statistically significant.  
JEL: O30, O33, Q55 
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Big Science projects are expensive, while the ultimate impact of discovery on society is 
unpredictable, particularly for basic research. It may take decades to understand how the 
knowledge of fundamental features of nature may be of any practical use. In the meantime 
governments are expected to support investment in science against uncertain social returns. 
There are, however, benefits that can be observed even during the construction phase of a large 
research infrastructure. Some of these arise from unprecedented technological challenges (1). To 
achieve the exacting standards of experimental devices at the frontier of science close 
collaboration is needed between laboratories and firms in the supply chain of discovery 
machines. Such collaboration generates learning effects, which directly spill over as an 
externality from basic research to firms through procurement contracts. Technological learning 
can lead firms to product and process innovation and ultimately to increased growth 
opportunities. Can we measure these economic effects?  
Several approaches have been tried (2). Case histories may offer interesting qualitative 
insights into the learning effects of technological procurement by research infrastructures, and 
subsequent commercial developments by firms (3, 4). Failures to translate R&D in marketable 
innovation are rarely reported, and this creates a selection bias. Surveys of stakeholders may be 
more informative. Some years ago a survey (5) of CERN suppliers found that product innovation 
was developed by more than one third of the firms; around 15% started either new R&D or a 
new business unit, or opened a new market; more than 40% of the respondents stated that after 
the contract the firm was more internationalized and benefited from technological learning. The 
average combined value of suppliers’ sales to other clients and cost savings was reported to be 
three times the amount of the order by CERN. One problem with surveys is, again, that managers 
with success stories will be happier to respond than others. Looking for more objective evidence, 
aggregate statistical approaches have been used for decades for a range of programs, from NASA 
(6) to biotechnology (7). Input-output tables representing average national or regional inter-
industry linkages and investment multipliers were used to compute the impact of research 
spending on GDP or productivity. These procedures are basically numerical simulations, and the 
results are highly dependent on some macroeconomic assumptions (8).  
We have tried a new empirical strategy based on micro-data: the procurement contract 
between a firm and its client, the institution managing a research infrastructure, is considered 
similar to an event that, beyond its short run impact, may or may not change over time the 
profitability of the firm, net of any confounding factor, such as the economic conditions in the 
country.  
The Large Hadron Collider is an ideal testing ground for our approach. First, because its 
design and construction have pushed technology beyond previous limits in several fields, such as 
superconductivity, cryogenics, electromagnets, ultra-high vacuum, distributed computing, rad-
resistance materials, fast electronics, etc. (9), but they also required large quantities of standard 
products, such as building work, pipes, heating equipment, electrical power, etc. Thus, there is 
variability in the technological intensity of procurement, and we take advantage of this fact. 
Also, the number of suppliers involved, the international scope of the procurement process, the 
wide range of sectors, and particularly the long time span of the construction process offer 
additional statistical variability to the empirical analysis. 
CERN granted us access to the procurement data for LHC between 1995 and 2008. There 
were 1,360 suppliers with least one order of over CHF 10,000, for a total of 11,969 orders (Fig. 
1). These suppliers of LHC technology were located in 35 countries, including China, Japan, 
Russia, and the United States, but over 99% of the orders in terms of value were placed with 
European firms. For each supplier we recorded the location, the year and value of each order, 
and the activity code (e.g. “23. power cables and conductors”; “58. precision machining work”; 
“71. films and emulsions”). We classified each order on a technology intensity scale, where at 
the lower end there were ‘off the shelf’ non-high-technology products, and at the upper end 
products at the frontier of technology requiring intensive customization and co-development with 
CERN (Fig. 2).  
Out of the original list of LHC suppliers (which included other laboratories, joint 
ventures, etc.) we identified 1,060 companies in AMADEUS and ORBIS, two global company 
financial databases maintained by Bureau Van Dijk (10). Out of these, we drew the LHC 
suppliers for which the core financial indicators were available, as far as possible, over the time 
span 1991-2013. This was a sufficiently long period in order to study the effect of procurement 
contracts on the firms’ profitability. Around 350 companies met this criterion, leading to a 
sufficiently large and representative sample for the final empirical analysis.  
The most interesting performance variable for our research question is the profit margin, 
defined as the ratio of EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) to operating revenues. It is 
around 4.6% on average in the sample. This financial indicator is a dimensionless ratio, hence 
not directly affected by turnover size or by inflation, and widely acknowledged by management 
studies as highly informative about firms’ profitability.  
Is there any evidence in the data that the profit margin of suppliers of the LHC increased 
over time after the initial contract with CERN? To answer this question we built a dynamic panel 
data model. After transforming all the data in first differences, i.e. changes year by year, in order 
to consider trend effects, we included the lagged dependent variable (profit margins one year 
before the event) among the controls, the firms’ total assets as an additional control for size of 
the supplier and added time fixed-effects and a time trend variable. To further control for macro-
economic conditions, we included yearly GDP change in the country where the firm was located, 
and yearly GDP change in the OECD area. The event of the contract with CERN is recorded as 
zero prior to the first order being received, and one thereafter. Finally, each supplier was 
classified according to the technological intensity of the first order event.  
After controlling for the other covariates, the estimated CERN effect coefficient for the 
sample is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that being a supplier of the LHC is 
correlated to increased firm profitability. But to what extent is this effect driven by the 
technological intensity of the procurement? This was our main question, and a simple way to test 
this was to split the sample in two: high-tech and non-high-tech suppliers, according to the above 
mentioned classification. We find that CERN effect vanishes for non-high-tech firms (the 
coefficient is still positive but no longer statistically significant), while it is confirmed as highly 
statistically significant, and with a higher coefficient, for high-tech firms.  
The interpretation of these findings is straightforward. Had we found that a CERN effect 
was significant also for firms involved in non-high-tech procurement, one may have thought that 
what we observed was mainly the possible impact of a generic reputational effect in increasing 
market opportunities or claiming higher prices. But the clear-cut finding that the CERN effect 
was important for high-tech firms, but not for the others, suggests that a learning process leading 
to product and process innovation ultimately boosted the profitability of high-tech firms. We 
cannot exclude that a specific reputational effect may have played a role for these firms as well. 
They can advertise their success in dealing with the demanding requirements of LHC 
technology, possibly a convincing marketing argument. This combination of innovation and 
reputation effects is, after all, exactly what previous narratives and surveys would have 
suggested, but without being able to show the objective statistical evidence on profitability that 
we have detected.  
There are two messages arising from these findings, both with some implications for 
science policy. First, it would be helpful if the institutions managing the research infrastructures 
made the information on their procurement available for independent inquiry, as CERN did for 
us. Matching these data with the long-term financial data of the firms in the supply chain seems 
both feasible and informative.  
Moreover, governments and funding agencies should take note that a non-negligible part 
of taxpayers’ money is paid back to society in the form of increased profitability for the high-
tech firms, particularly of innovative small-medium enterprises (11): around 75 per cent of 
CERN suppliers in our data have less than 250 employees. While perhaps in some distant future 
scientists and engineers may find a practical application for the discovery of the Higgs boson, in 
a relatively short time (within a decade or so for the median order during the construction of the 
LHC) there are already market responses to investments in science. These responses are 
mediated by high-tech firms involved in the procurement of large-scale research infrastructures, 
and, in principle, the economic impacts can be quantified. Naturally, there are other propagation 
channels (12) of the social benefits of Big Science, such as human capital and cultural effects 
(13) and technology transfer (14). We do not claim that any project can be justified because of 
technological spillovers alone, but it is worth trying to record and measure them against the 
investment costs. 
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Fig. 1. Distribution by year of LHC procurement orders and of first-time orders to a 
supplier. Total CERN orders each year is the sum of the number of all the orders above CHF 
10,000 in that year, including multiple orders to individual firms. First time orders are the 
number of orders that were agreed with a firm for the first time in that year. (First orders of 
1995=2; 1996=17; 2008=4). Source: Our processing of CERN data. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of high-tech CERN orders for LHC by activity code. Percent share of 
number of orders. Minor items omitted. Source: our processing of CERN data. 
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Supplementary Text 
These Supplementary Materials text contain the details of the research supporting 
the Policy Forum paper “The economic impact of CERN procurement: evidence from the 
Large Hadron Collider”. It is in four parts: Context, Data, Methods, Results.  
 
1. Context.  
Construction work for the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for 
Nuclear Research (CERN) started in 1993 and lasted until 2008. The LHC began 
operating in 2009 and it is foreseen to continue for at least another decade. It is the largest 
particle accelerator in the world and its technology is extremely complex. Protons and 
atomic nuclei are accelerated by subjecting them to electric fields and made to collide 
with each other, with the goal of studying the structure of matter. To do so, particles are 
collimated into focused beams through strong magnetic fields. The beams travel in a pipe 
in which an ultra-high vacuum has been created, and are brought to collide in 
experimental areas where the debris of the collisions are accurately measured by 
detectors, managed by international Collaborations. When observing particle collisions, 
the experiments produce about 1 GB of data per second, which are either analyzed inside 
by LHC Collaborations, or sent to a number of other computer centers around the world, 
connected through the worldwide LHC computer grid. The main technological features of 
LHC are available at (15). 
 
2. Data 
We present here data on CERN procurement related to the LHC; classification of 
orders by technological intensity; suppliers of LHC and their distribution by sector; 
distribution of suppliers by country; financial data of suppliers; macroeconomic controls. 
 
2.1 Procurement orders data 
Our main source of original data is CERN Procurement and Industrial Services 
(http://procurement.web.cern.ch/procurement-strategy-and-policy), which is in charge of 
coordinating all the supplies and services needed by the laboratory. Experiments, such as 
ATLAS and CMS, have some procurement autonomy and their orders are not fully 
covered here. CERN Procurement regularly monitors and reports all supply activities to 
the management and the Member States and in 2015 it provided us with several 
extractions from the full dataset of orders specifically intended to implement the 
construction of the LHC. The construction period considered is 1995-2008, i.e. before the 
accelerator started regular operation. Only orders above a CHF 10k threshold have been 
included, as we wanted to exclude a large number of marginal suppliers for which 
knowledge spillovers from LHC procurement are unlikely.  
The total number of orders selected with these criteria was 11,969. Around 99% of 
the orders were placed between 1996 and 2007 with a peak in 2003. Figure 1 plots the 
distribution of all the orders by year. It also shows the distribution by year of the initial 
procurement events, i.e. the number of times a different company became a CERN 
supplier for the LHC. These first events mark the beginning of a potential learning 
process. This is our variable of interest. The subsequent time profile is, however, also 
informative: the average number of years in which a company received at least one order 
in that year is 2.3 (standard deviation 1.94, minimum 1 and maximum 11 years). This 
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implies that the direct impact of the orders on company profitability could not last on 
average more than around 2-3 years, and we are interested to study economic effects also 
beyond these initial years. The first-year events in our study are evenly spread between 
1997-2006, differently from total orders, that show a peak in 2003. Around 95 new 
suppliers were involved in the LHC in any of the years of the above mentioned decade. 
We take advantage in the empirical analysis of the fact that we do not have just one 
‘before-after’ group of events, but a sequence of ten such groups. For example, a 
company entering in the CERN procurement system in year 2000 potentially can be 
observed for 10 years before the event (including year 2000, as we have financial data 
1991-2013, see Section 2.5) and 13 years thereafter. For a company entering in one of the 
last groups, e.g. 2007, we have potentially 6 years of ‘after’ observations and 18 years of 
‘before’ observations.  
 
2.2 Classification of orders by technological intensity 
CERN orders in the original database are classified by an “activity code”, a number 
that identifies the type of product. The classification system is up to 3-digit level, with the 
latter being extremely detailed. We focused on the 2-digit level, which included around 
100 items and was adequately detailed for our analysis. In some cases we also inspected 
the 3-digit level to better interpret the technological content of the order.  
After a preliminary analysis to understand the overall distribution of the orders by 
code, we identified the specific activity codes that were more likely to be associated with 
high technological intensity goods and services supplied for the construction of the LHC. 
The code descriptors in some cases were generic (for example “28-Electrical 
engineering” or “45-Software”). To minimize classification errors we sampled 300 orders 
for a more in-depth analysis. These orders were placed with 207 different suppliers, 
representing around 14% of all the 1442 suppliers that received at least one order for the 
LHC during the period considered. The sampled orders were then evaluated in detail by 
CERN experts and classified in terms of technological intensity according to a five-point 
scale. The scale was intended to capture differences in both the specificity of the products 
and the degree of collaboration between CERN and its suppliers. It included the 
following classes:  
Class 1: most likely "off-the-shelf" orders with low technological intensity;  
Class 2: off-the-shelf orders with an average technological intensity;  
Class 3: mostly off-the-shelf, but usually high-tech and requiring some careful 
specification;  
Class 4: high-tech orders with a moderate to high intensity of the specification 
activity to customize products for LHC;  
Class 5: products at the frontiers of technology with intensive customization and co-
design involving CERN staff. 
As a further step, the high-tech activity codes were identified as those included in 
Classes 3-4-5. Finally, this analysis was used to classify the suppliers of LHC into two 
broad groups, according to the opportunity they had to deliver high-tech orders in the 
initial event, see Figure S1.  
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2.3 Suppliers of the LHC by sector  
According to the activity code assigned to the first order, around 61% of the 
companies in the CERN dataset belonged to the high-tech category. There was some risk 
of misclassification, because it may have been the case that over time a non-high-tech 
company was able to supply high-tech orders and vice versa, as many companies 
received several orders, not necessarily with the same activity code. In fact, on average 
around nine orders were allocated to each contractual partner, several of them in the same 
year. Considering high-tech and non-high-tech companies separately, the number of years 
in which an order was allocated was respectively 2.48 (Std Dev: 2.03; Min: 1; Max: 11) 
and 2.03 (Std Dev: 1.73; Min: 1; Max: 11), which suggested a slightly greater continuity 
of procurement relations between CERN and the high-tech companies. Inspection of the 
data suggested that the first order in the series was, in general, a good predictor of the 
technological intensity of subsequent orders.  
We also wanted to compare our classification of companies by technological 
intensity with the industrial sector to which they belonged, which is a more generic 
classification. To do so we recovered the company NACE Rev2 code (Statistical 
classification of economic activities in the European Community, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF) from 
the global company databases AMADEUS and ORBIS, maintained by Bureau Van Dijk 
(see the following section). Table S1 provides the distribution by 2-digit NACE code of 
the companies identified by matching the CERN database and the AMADEUS and 
ORBIS data. Looking at the firms’ distribution by NACE code, around 50% of the 
suppliers we analyzed were in the manufacturing sector (but the actual share in terms of 
manufacturing firms indirectly involved by CERN procurement was higher as several 
firms classified as “Wholesale Trade” also delivered some manufactured goods). Using 
the NACE classification apparently does not capture the technological intensity of the 
orders or of the firm itself. Thus, to correctly interpret our analysis, when we refer to a 
“high-tech company” we mean a company that - in whatever NACE sector it is classified 
- was selected by CERN as a supplier of a high-tech order in the first place.  
 
2.4 Distribution of the sample by country 
Our sample comprised only the CERN suppliers included in the AMADEUS and 
ORBIS databases. The AMADEUS database collects balance-sheet records for European 
companies and contains financial information on over 7 million companies, while the 
ORBIS database also includes companies from the rest of the world. Exploiting these 
sources, we were able to identify 1,060 companies out of the 1,360 contracting units 
listed in the original CERN database. Matching of the different sources unavoidably 
reduced the number of observations (for example, because some suppliers are not firms 
but other laboratories, or simply because their financial data are not recorded). Figure S2 
summarizes the distribution of the companies across countries, both in the original CERN 
database and in our sample, also highlighting the number and share of high-tech 
companies according to our classification. The former were located in 27 different 
countries: 22 were from European Union and five from outside. We found no financial 
data for LHC suppliers in: Belarus, China, India, Pakistan, Romania, Taiwan, and United 
Arab Republic. Almost 96% of the companies were located in Europe. In terms of loss of 
data, when moving from the CERN dataset to AMADEUS-ORBIS financial data, France 
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and Switzerland were less represented in our sample than in the original procurement 
data. These are the two countries where the CERN is located, but the relative under-
representation in our sample is not a matter of concern, as in fact a large number of firms 
from these countries are included in our analysis. 
 
2.5 Financial data 
Following the technological intensity classification provided above, 62.4% of the 
companies in our sample could be classified as high-tech suppliers ( with a very modest 
over-representation of less than 2% relative to the original CERN data). Exploiting the 
AMADEUS and ORBIS databases, we searched for information on firms’ performance 
indicators over the time span 1991-2013. We focused particularly on the profit margin, 
defined as the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to operating revenues. 
Over the time span considered, the average value of the EBIT margin in the sample was 
4.58%. For the companies classified as high-tech, the sample mean value of the EBIT 
margin was slightly higher at 4.62%. For non-high-tech companies the average EBIT 
margin was 4.52%. Hence, in terms of descriptive statistics the two subgroups do not 
greatly differ in their average or median performance, see Table S.2. This is an important 
empirical feature, as our findings discriminate the different responses to first procurement 
events by the two groups of firms, despite their similar average profitability in the first 
place.  
As there may be a size effect in the ability of a firm to capture technology spillovers, 
we also recovered data on companies’ total assets (the sum of fixed and current assets) 
and used this information as a micro-control for firms’ size in our regression analysis. For 
the median company total assets were €5.604 million in the full sample, €6.828 and 
€4.576 million for high-tech and non-high-tech companies, respectively. The mean value 
of total assets in the full sample is much higher (€962.363 million: €1,132.241 million 
respectively for high-tech companies and €772.260 million for non-high-tech ones). 
These high averages were influenced by the presence in our sample of about 20 
companies that were outliers in terms of very large size. The fact that the distribution of 
companies by assets is highly skewed reflects the usual ‘pyramid’ structure of the 
industry. Trimming the size distribution of firms for empirical analysis was also tested, 
with limited changes in the results.  
 
2.6 Macroeconomic controls 
On the demand side GDP growth may have an influence on the EBIT margin 
because a higher GDP growth may increase the demand for goods and the profitability of 
firms. We use two controls: yearly GDP growth of each country where suppliers were 
located and average yearly GDP growth in the OECD area to account for foreign market 
opportunities. (Source of data: World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx). 
 
3 Methods  
We were interested in studying the effect that becoming a CERN supplier had on 
company performance, distinguishing between high-tech and non-high-tech firms and 
taking advantage of the time variations in the procurement events. In our data, at the 
beginning of the period we consider (1991), no firm is a CERN supplier for the LHC. At 
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the end of the period all firms are CERN suppliers. In the middle years there is a 
sequence of events occurring between 1995 and 2008, and a transition of status for each 
firm in different years. Our general approach was to estimate the effect that receiving an 
order from CERN had, over time, on a firm-level performance variable, controlling for 
firm-level characteristics, the macroeconomic situation, a time-trend variable and firm-
level fixed-effects. Given the potential existence of trends that might have affected the 
results of our estimates, the performance variable and the variables included in the 
vectors of controls were taken in first-differences, i.e. changes year by year. Specifically, 
the empirical model we are estimating is the following: 
 ∆!"#$%&'()*!"#!= !"#$%!"# + !!∆!"#$%&''(#'!"! + ∆!"#$%&'()*!"#!!! + !!∆!"#!"+ !!∆!"#_!"#$! + !"#$%! + !! + !! + !!" 
 
where the superscript J=H, N identifies high-tech and non-high-tech companies. 
• ∆EBITmargin!"#!  is the change of firm’s i profit margin, located in country c, at 
time t, and defined as the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to 
operating revenues; 
• CERNict  is a dummy variable that takes value 0 before the first year the company 
received an order from CERN and 1 thereafter;  
• ∆TotalAssets!"# are defined as changes in the sum of fixed and current assets and 
account for variations in firm size that may affect its profitability; 
• ∆EBITmargin!"#!!!  is the one-year-lagged value of the profit margin change, which 
is included to account for the company’s past performance;  
• ∆!"#!"and ∆GDP_OECD! are changes, respectively, in the GDP growth rates of 
the country where the firm is located, and of the OECD Area, and allow us to 
control for respectively idiosyncratic and systemic economic shocks.  
• yeart  is a trend variable controlling for potential time-patterns and takes values 
from 1 to 23, which is the time-span in years covered by our data (1991-2013); 
• !! is a vector of time fixed-effects. 
• µi  is a vector of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific characteristics;  
• the coefficients to be estimated are β , for the CERN effect; γ1 , γ2 for the firm 
level controls; δ1 ,δ2  for the macroeconomic controls, ρ  for the trend variable. 
• Finally, the error term u!" is clustered by country, allowing for error correlation 
within the same country. 
In this setting, OLS regression would lead to biased estimates of the vectors of 
regressors’ coefficients due to the potential correlation between unobservable firm-
specific characteristics that do not vary over time and the set of explanatory variables. 
Hence, we estimate the model using a Fixed-Effect (FE) regression that allows us to 
capture the impact of variables that change over time. FE regression controls for time-
invariant differences between observations, therefore eliminating the potential bias due to 
the omission of fixed unobserved firm-specific variables, like, for example, a firm’s 
quality of management, corporate governance, reputation, etc. Moreover, the result of the 
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Hausman Test, a test that discriminates between Fixed- and Random-effect models, also 
suggests that, given our data, the preferred alternative is the FE regression.  
 
4 Results 
The results of Fixed-Effect regressions are presented in Table S3. The coefficient of 
the CERN effect, our variable of interest, is positive and statistically significant for the 
sample of all the suppliers (p value = 0.032). The result is driven by the high-tech 
suppliers, as for these firms the coefficient is greater and highly statistically significant 
for the high-technology suppliers (p value = 0.001), but not for the others (p value = 
0.256), suggesting that only high-tech suppliers’ profitability responds to procurement in 
the long term. Among the controls, a size effect of the change in total assets is significant 
for non-high-tech suppliers. Past change in profit margin is inversely correlated to current 
profit change, in a statistically highly significant way, suggesting a smoothing process 
over time. Among the macroeconomic controls the coefficient of the OECD area GDP 
change is significant and positive for high-tech companies. Years fixed effects are always 
positive and most of them are highly significant. Trimming the sample for outliers, or 
using the full 1 to 5 technological scale by scoring each firm with an average score, or 
trying alternative estimation methods consistently confirms the main finding presented in 
Table S3 (second column). As the dependent variable is defined as a change year by year 
of the profit margin, the estimated coefficient of the CERN effect roughly corresponds 
ceteris paribus to around one point increase of the profit margin, relative to the average 
levels reported in Table S.2.  
Detailed data and statistical codes for this paper are available at: 
http://www.eiburs.unimi.it/?page=procurement_data 
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Fig. S1. Distribution of CERN procurement orders for LHC by activity code. 
Number of orders.  
High-tech: 26. Magnets 66. Low-temperature materials 59. Specialized techniques 67. 
Vacuum components & chambers 64. Storage and transport of cryogens 51. Raw 
materials (supplies) 23. Power cables and conductors 24. Control and communication 
cables 21. Switch gear and switchboards 25. Power suppliers and converters 57. General 
machining work 62. Refrigeration equipment 58. Precision machining work 52. Machine 
tools, workshop and quality control equipment 65. Measurement equipment (vacuum and 
low-temperature technology) 32. Passive electronic components 53. Casting and molding 
(manufacturing techniques) 34. Power suppliers - transformers 74. Special detectors 
components 36. RF and microwave components and equipment 56. Sheet metal work 
(manufacturing techniques) Others. Wire chamber elements and Calorimeter elements. 
Non high-tech: 14. Electrical Installation Work 11. Building Work 27. Measurement and 
Regulation Others. Electronics, Electrical Engineering, Data Communication, Data-
Processing Peripherals, Power Transformers, Radiation Protection, Circuit Boards, 
Interfaces , Scintillation Counter Components, Vacuum and Low-Temperature 
Technology, Storage Systems, Consumables Items for Data-Processing, Storage (Data-
Processing) 31. Active Electronic Components 15. Heating and Air Conditioning 
Equipment (Supply and Installation) 13. Installation and Supply of Pipes 35. Functional 
Modules & Crates (See Also 44 and 48 Series) 18. Civil Engineering and Buildings 16. 
Hoisting Gear 33. Electronic Measuring Instruments 17. Water Supply and Treatment 63. 
Gas-Handling Equipment 41. Computers and Work-Stations 29. Electrical Engineering 
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Components 39. Electronic Assembly and Wiring Work 68. Low-Temperature 
Components 45. Software 54. Forging (Manufacturing Techniques) 55. Boiler Metal 
Work (Manufacturing Techniques) 61. Vacuum Pumps 12. Road works. Source: Our 
processing of CERN data. 
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Fig. S2. Distribution of LHC suppliers across countries. Number of companies having 
received at least one order over CHF 10,000 by country where the company is located. 
CERN data compared with our sample. Source: Our processing of CERN data. 
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Table S1. LHC suppliers distribution by NACE code. NACE Rev2 Classification. 
Other includes: 13. Manufacture of textiles; 16. Manufacture of wood and of products of 
wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials; 
38. Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; 49. Land transport and transport 
via pipelines; materials recovery; 58. Publishing activities; 63. Information service 
activities; 69. Legal and accounting activities; 74. Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities; 81. Services to buildings and landscape activities; 84. Public 
administration and defense; 91. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities; 
94. Activities of membership organizations; 95. Repair of computers and personal and 
household goods. Source: Our processing of CERN and AMADEUS-ORBIS data 
 
NACE code 2 digits n° of 
firms 
%  NACE code 2 digits n° of 
firms 
% 
20. Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
13 1.31  43. Specialized construction 
activities 
55 5.56 
22. Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products 
18 1.82  45. Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles  
3 0.30 
23. Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 
11 1.11  46. Wholesale trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
207 20.93 
24. Manufacture of basic metals 31 3.13  47. Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
5 0.51 
25. Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery  
98 9.91  61. Telecommunications 6 0.61 
26. Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 
134 13.55  62. Computer programming, 
consultancy  
20 2.02 
27. Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 
87 8.80  64. Financial service activities, 
except insurance  
20 2.02 
28. Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
89 9.00  70. Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy  
13 1.31 
30. Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
7 0.71  71. Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing  
40 4.04 
32. Other manufacturing 11 1.11  72. Scientific research and 
development 
18 1.82 
33. Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 
20 2.02  77. Rental and leasing activities 3 0.30 
35. Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
3 0.30  82. Office support and other 
business support activities 
10 1.01 
41. Construction of buildings 13 1.31  85. Education 7 0.71 
42. Civil engineering 11 1.11  Other (1) 26 2.59 
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Table S2. EBIT margin descriptive statistics. EBIT margin = EBIT/Operating 
Revenues. 25th and 75th are percentiles. Source: Our processing of CERN and 
AMADEUS-ORBIS data 
 
 average std. dev. 25th median 75th 
Total sample 4.58% 12.94 1.21% 4.26% 8.45% 
High-tech 4.62% 13.44 1.35% 4.46% 8.53% 
Non-hi-tech 4.52% 11.98 0.95% 3.84% 8.15% 
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Table S3. Regression results 
  EBIT MARGIN (%)  
 Full Sample High-Tech Firms Non High-Tech Firms 
CERN Effect 0.673*** 1.007*** 0.642 
  (2.35) (4.24) (1.19) 
Firm Level Controls     
∆Total Assets1 -0.006 -0.061 0.028*** 
  (0.36) (0.65) (2.61) 
∆EBIT margin, 1-year lagged value  -0.341*** -0.351*** -0.285*** 
 (14.72) (10.46) (7.63) 
Macroeconomic Controls    
∆GDP growth rate, firm’s country -0.030 -0.061 0.062 
 (0.17) (0.29) (0.19) 
∆GDP growth rate, OECD Area 0.383*** 0.416* 0.264 
 (2.99) (1.94) (0.84) 
Year -0.004 -0.051 0.049 
 (0.08) (0.95) (0.74) 
Years Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -2.803*** -2.511*** -3.239** 
 (4.09) (2.69) (2.40) 
Number of observations 4856 3017 1676 
1 in millions. Standard Errors are clustered by country. t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
